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Equal or Equitable Pay?: Individual Differences in Pay Fairness Perceptions 
 
Abstract 
This study examined how social comparison (i.e., comparing one’s pay to similar others’ pay) 
and deserved comparison (i.e., comparing one’s pay to one’s deserved pay) affect pay fairness 
perceptions, and the individual differences in the comparison processes. Results based on a field 
study with a sample of 167 employees showed that pay fairness was low when employees 
received lower pay than a similar other (or what they deserved), increased as their pay exceeded 
that of a similar other (or deserved pay) to some extent, and then decreased when overpayment 
was considerable. Second, pay fairness increased as one’s actual and similar others’ pay levels 
both increased while pay fairness remained the same as one’s actual and the deserved pay levels 
both increased. In addition, the “threshold” that people start to perceive overpayment as less fair 
occurred more quickly for those with higher preference for consistency in social comparison and 
for those with higher preference for the merit principle in deserved comparison. We also 
conducted experiments, and the results generally replicated the findings in the field study. These 
findings offer theoretical implications regarding organizational justice, as well as practical 
implications for designing and executing compensation system. 
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Pay is a critical influencer on the quality and effectiveness of human capital (Gupta & 
Shaw, 2014), and pay fairness perceptions matter in explaining a range of employees’ work 
attitudes and behaviors in organizations (He, Long, & Kuvaas, 2016; Kwon, Kim, Kang, & Kim, 
2008; van Dierendonck & Jacobs, 2012). Management researchers have devoted much attention 
to the factors affecting pay fairness perceptions. One important work is Adams’s (1965) seminal 
article on equity theory, which delineates the cognitive process that people engage to form pay 
fairness perceptions. Equity theory focuses on pay fairness perceptions formed by comparing 
one’s pay against that of similar others (i.e., social comparison, Greenberg, Ashton-James, & 
Ashkanasy, 2007; Peters, van den Bos, & Bobocel, 2004; van den Bos & Lind, 2001). On the 
other hand, a line of recent justice research posits that pay fairness perceptions can also be 
affected by the comparison of their pay against a standard of what they believe they deserve (i.e., 
deserved comparison), and transgression of this standard is perceived as unfair (Folger & 
Cropanzano, 2001; Leung & Tong, 2003; Luna-Arocas & Tang, 2015; Skitka & Mullen, 2002).  
Both lines of research enhance the understanding on how people make pay fairness 
perceptions, but several important issues remain unaddressed. A first question that has 
surprisingly been omitted from prior research regarding pay fairness dynamics is: how are 
employees’ pay fairness perceptions influenced when their pay level exceeds what similar others 
receive (or deserved pay level) and when they view their pay level relative to that of similar 
others (or deserved pay level) to be both low or both high? The literature mainly adopts 
experiments to manipulate the underpayment and overpayment scenarios without examining the 
effects of the continuous degree of pay discrepancy (e.g., Clay-Warner, Robinson, Smith-Lovin, 
Rogers, & James, 2016; De Cremer & Van Kleef, 2009; Liu & Brockner, 2015; Peters, van den 
Bos, & Karremans, 2008; van den Bos, Peters, Bobocel, & Ybema, 2006). As an exception, Kim, 
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Edwards, and Shapiro (2015) treated pay discrepancy as a continuum and unveiled the 
complexity regarding the joint effects of one and similar others’ pay level on pay fairness. Kim 
et al. (2015) found a non-symmetrical curvilinear relationship among Chinese, Japanese, and 
Korean employees, such that pay fairness increased as one’s pay increases toward that of similar 
others, continued to increase as one’s pay level exceeded what similar others received, and then 
decreased when the overpayment became excessive; pay fairness increased as one’s and similar 
others’ pay level both increased. However, we do not know how the comparison of one’s actual 
pay level to the deserved pay level dynamically relates to pay fairness. In particular, we are 
unsure whether a non-symmetrical curvilinear relationship also applies in deserved comparison 
and how pay fairness changes as one’s actual and the deserved pay levels both increase. Whether 
the non-symmetrical curvilinear relationship between social comparison and pay fairness can be 
generalized in other cultural contexts (e.g., the United States) also remains unclear. In addition, 
theoretically driven research that integrates individual differences and justice perceptions 
remains scarce, despite the call for further studies on individual differences and justice (Colquitt 
& Greenberg, 2003; Colquitt, Scott, Judge, & Shaw, 2006; Major & Deaux, 1982; Rupp & Bell, 
2010). No research examines in detail how the effects of social/deserved comparison on pay 
fairness can vary across individuals.  
To address these research gaps, we theorize and test a non-symmetric curvilinear 
relationship between social/deserved comparison and pay fairness by employing social and 
deserved comparisons processes (discussed in our Literature Review section) among American 
employees. We also examine how pay fairness changes as one’s actual pay level and a similar 
other’s pay level (or the deserved pay level) both increase. In addition, this study explores 
individual differences as contingent factors for the non-symmetric curvilinear relationship 
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between social/deserved comparison and pay fairness. We specifically study how the preference 
for consistency, which focuses on the sensitivity of people to consistent outcomes (Nail et al., 
2001), and the preference for the merit principle, which focuses on the sensitivity of people to 
equitable allocations (Major, Kaiser, O'Brien, & McCoy, 2007), affect the relationships between 
social/deserved comparison and pay fairness. We constructively replicate the findings obtained 
from the survey by using scenario-based experiments, which provide evidence of causality 
implied in our hypothesized relationships and enhance the internal validity of our research. 
Our study provides three important contributions to the justice literature. First, we 
integrate the two types of cognitive appraisals (i.e., social and deserved comparisons) in one 
theoretical model, thus providing a comprehensive understanding of how pay fairness 
perceptions are formed. We can also respond to Cropanzano, Goldman, and Folger’s (2003, p. 
1022) call for a new research agenda to explore “cognitive processing mechanisms for 
generating justice judgments.” Second, by examining the non-symmetric curvilinear relationship 
between social/deserved comparison and pay fairness, we delineate the pattern of how pay 
fairness perceptions are affected by the continuum from underpayment to overpayment with 
greater precision than previous studies. Third, investigating the moderating effects of individual 
differences in the relationships between social/deserved comparison and pay fairness helps us 
specify the boundary conditions of justice effects and provides insights into relevant justice 
theories. Our study sheds light on how and why people react differently to social/deserved 
comparison processes in forming pay fairness perceptions. In addition, our study helps 
practitioners understand how employees’ comparisons of their actual pay to that of similar others 
and to their internal standards on how they should be treated can influence their pay fairness 
perceptions. Specifically, this study offers precise understanding of how pay fairness perceptions 
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change in facing a continuum of pay discrepancy situations (i.e., underpayment vs. overpayment) 
and why employees respond to the same pay level differently. 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
One fundamental principle in the justice literature is that individuals form pay fairness 
perceptions by comparing their work experiences with those of similar others to yield social 
comparison (Chen, Choi, & Chi, 2002; Greenberg, 1983). Adams (1965) argues that when 
making pay fairness judgments, individuals evaluate their pay relative to their inputs and then 
compare that ratio to the ratio of similar others. In a similar vein, Folger and Cropanzano (2001) 
posit that people judge the fairness of an event by imagining how the event will turn out if 
experienced by a similar other. These arguments have received some empirical support. For 
example, Austin, McGinn, and Susmilch (1980) found that fairness perceptions were 
significantly affected by the rewards relative to the ones a similar other receives. There are a 
number of important extensions of this line of research. For example, van den Bos and his 
colleagues examined pay fairness judgments under special situations, such as not knowing 
similar others’ pay or when cognitive processing was limited (van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & 
Wilke, 1997; van den Bos et al., 2006).  
In addition to social comparison, the justice literature indicates that justice judgments can 
be affected by deserved comparison (i.e., the comparison between how a person is treated and 
what he/she believes he/she deserves, Folger & Cropanzano, 2001; Leung & Tong, 2003; Luna-
Arocas & Tang, 2015; Skitka & Mullen, 2002). Deserved comparison should be distinguished 
from social comparison. As a referent to evaluate actual pay for pay fairness judgments, deserved 
comparison focuses on internal standards such as moral mandates or job-related inputs while 
social comparison uses similar others (Berkowitz, Fraser, Treasure, & Cochran, 1987). Deserved 
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comparison can be as important as social comparison in employees’ fairness judgments. Building 
upon the deontic model of justice (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001), Leung and Tong (2003) propose 
a normative model of justice. This model posits that people hold internalized deserved standards 
of appropriate conduct, which is derived from their moral mandates and ethical orientation 
(Cropanzano & Rupp, 2002). These deserved standards provide the yardstick to make fairness 
judgments, and “complying with internal justice standards … is an end and satisfying in and of 
itself” (Leung & Tong, 2003, p. 105). Although this set of deserved standards has moral 
connotations, it is broader than merely morality concerns (Leung & Tong, 2003). This set is also 
based on job-related inputs (contributions), the market value of one’s work, and perceived social 
consensus (e.g., shared guidelines of acceptable rewards). When their pay deviates from what 
they believe they deserve, people tend to perceive unfairness. 
Deserved comparison differs from social comparison in two main aspects. First, while 
with social comparison people evaluate whether they are fairly treated based on the comparison 
with similar others, with deserved comparison people decide what a fair return is based on their 
internal standards (i.e., deserved treatment, Berkowitz et al., 1987). In addition, social 
comparison is mainly motivated by self-interests as justice provides an effective method to avoid 
exploitation in a group, whereas deserved comparison is largely driven by deontic motives and 
morality needs because justice is the right thing to do (Cropanzano & Rupp, 2002). Revealing 
the effects of both social and deserved comparison on pay fairness delineates a more 
comprehensive picture of how people form distributive justice perceptions. 
Taking stock of current literature on social and deserved comparisons associated with pay 
fairness, several important issues have to be addressed. For example, the social comparison 
literature has mainly adopted an experimental design to manipulate the underpayment and 
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overpayment scenarios without examining the effects of the continuous degree of pay 
discrepancy (e.g., Clay-Warner et al., 2016; De Cremer & Van Kleef, 2009; Liu & Brockner, 
2015; Peters et al., 2008; van den Bos et al., 2006). However, in real-life organizational settings, 
pay discrepancy is a continuum.  
Second, related to the experimental design, the existing studies on social comparison paid 
little attention to examining the complexity regarding the influence of the continuous degree of 
pay discrepancy, which involves the interplay of one’s actual pay and pay that similar others 
receive on the formation of pay fairness perceptions. As discussed previously, most studies on 
the effects of social comparison on justice perceptions (e.g., Chen et al., 2002; Leung, Smith, 
Wang, & Sun, 1996) do not explicitly examine how employees’ pay fairness perceptions are 
influenced when their pay level exceeds what similar others receive nor examine how pay 
fairness perceptions differ at the pay congruence situations with different absolute pay levels 
(i.e., high versus low).  
Third, despite the initial conceptualization of deserved comparison (Folger & 
Cropanzano, 2001; Leung & Tong, 2003; Luna-Arocas & Tang, 2015; Skitka & Mullen, 2002), 
there is a lack of theoretical and empirical work on the effects of deserved comparison on pay 
fairness. In particular, we are unsure whether the non-symmetrical curvilinear relationship 
associated with social comparison found in Kim et al. (2015) will also occur in deserved 
comparison and how pay fairness changes as one’s actual and the deserved pay levels both 
increase. In addition, current social and deserved comparisons literature has been restrictive in 
examining the individual differences in the effects of social/deserved comparison on pay 
fairness.  
To capture the potential complexities of the effects of social and deserved comparisons 
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on pay fairness, we examine how actual and comparative pay (i.e., pay that a similar other 
receives or that one believes he/she deserve to receive) jointly influence pay fairness. The joint 
effects can be examined by answering the following questions (cf., Edwards & Rothbard, 1999): 
(1) does pay fairness increase or decrease as individuals’ pay exceeds what similar others receive 
(or what they believe they should receive); and (2) does pay fairness remain the same when one’s 
pay is equal to what similar others receive (or what they believe they deserve to receive) at 
different absolute pay levels? We developed several hypotheses by answering these questions.  
Social Comparison and Pay Fairness 
We expect that pay fairness increases as individuals’ pay increases toward what similar 
others (i.e., peers who have similar job responsibilities with similar levels of education and 
experiences they bring to the job in the same organization) receive. First, when one and others 
are similar in terms of inputs (e.g., education, training, and experiences), the pay that is 
disadvantageous to one is perceived as unfair (Feinberg, 1974). That is, when making negatively 
discrepant comparisons to similar others, individuals feel unjustly deprived of something they 
desire that others have, thus resulting in perceived unfairness (Chen et al., 2002; Crosby, 1976).  
When individuals’ pay level exceeds that of similar others, pay fairness will continuously 
increase to some extent. Justice scholars (e.g., Adams, 1965; Chen et al., 2002; Cropanzano & 
Ambrose, 2015; Greenberg, 1983; Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 1998) have noted that people 
possess an “egocentric” bias in making justice judgments. That is, individuals see an outcome 
allocation favoring them as fair and do not perceive their advantageous pay compared with 
similar others as relatively unfair. Consistent with this finding, Adams (1965) posited that “the 
threshold would be higher presumably in cases of over-reward, for a certain amount of 
incongruity in these cases can be acceptably rationalized as ‘good fortune’ without attendant 
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discomfort” (p. 282). However, a very excessive pay as compared with similar others will 
intensify cognitive dissonance (e.g., self-interest conflicts with the belief that they and similar 
others should be treated equally [Adams, 1965]), which will make one feel uneasy or guilty 
(Homans, 1961). Consequently, such perception creates a sense of injustice (Weiss, Suckow, & 
Cropanzano, 1999). The foregoing discussion leads us to propose a non-symmetric curvilinear 
relationship between social comparison (i.e., comparison one’s pay level to that of similar others) 
and pay fairness. That is, we expect that: 
 Hypothesis 1a: The social comparison between one’s pay level and that of a similar 
other has a non-symmetric curvilinear relationship with pay fairness, such that pay 
fairness increases as one’s pay level increases toward that of a similar other, continues 
to increase as one’s pay level exceeds that of a similar other, and then decreases when 
the excess is considerable. 
Although justice is generally achieved when the same amount of pay is given to similar 
others regardless of whether such a pay is excellent or poor (Feinberg, 1974), we expect that 
perceived pay fairness is higher when one and similar others both receive high payment than low 
payment. The literature demonstrates that the favorability of one’s own pay level strongly 
influences one’s pay fairness (Ambrose, Kulik, & Harland, 1991). In addition, when the absolute 
level of pay is low, people tend to perceive low pay fairness despite similar others receiving the 
same low amount of pay (Tyler & Lind, 1992). One account for this  perception of unfairness is 
that people tend to view activities that violate their sacred human rights as unjust (Feinberg, 
1974). Folger, Cropanzano, and Goldman (2005) argue that violating the sacred human rights of 
anyone (not just one’s self) can provoke a sense of injustice. The human rights focus in the 
justice literature suggests that when employees and their similar others receive low pay, in 
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comparison to when both receive high pay, they are more likely to perceive such a pay level as 
violating their rights and being unfair. Supporting this reasoning, Kim et al. (2015) showed that 
distributive justice increased when the outcomes (i.e., pay, promotion, and job security) of one 
and similar others increased from low to high among East Asians (i.e., Chinese, Japanese, and 
South Koreans). Thus, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 1b: Pay fairness is higher when the pay level received by one and a similar 
other are both high than when both are low. 
Deserved Comparison and Pay Fairness 
We expect that pay fairness will increase as one’s actual pay level increases toward 
his/her deserved pay level. Deserved pay level refers to the level of pay that people believe they 
should receive based on their internal standards such as job-related contributions, and such a 
standard is relatively independent of what others receive (Berkowitz et al., 1987; Rice, Phillips, 
& McFarlin, 1990). When individuals receive a lower pay level than what they believe they 
deserve, they feel a fair share is not provided and perceive the pay level as unfair (Porter, 1962). 
Therefore, receiving a pay level that is worse than what one believes he/she deserves can drive a 
person to hold someone or an entity accountable for not satisfying the deserved standards, thus 
inducing a feeling of injustice (cf. Folger & Cropanzano, 2001).  
When one’s actual pay level exceeds one’s deserved pay level, pay fairness will 
continuously increase. As discussed above, people tend to have an egocentric bias, such that a 
favorable pay level higher than deserved pay would be positively associated with pay fairness. 
Similarly, Feinberg (1974) posited that excessive pay does not decrease pay fairness because the 
recipients have not been wronged, and they have no personal grievance. However, if the 
overpayment is excessive as compared to the deserved pay, people may feel uneasy or guilty 
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because the overpayment requires organizations or supervisors to sacrifice something in giving 
it, thus provoking a sense of injustice (Folger & Glerum, 2015; Weiss et al., 1999). For example, 
excessive rewards may hurt organizations as these unwarranted incentives deprive them the 
opportunity to use the resources for other purposes (e.g., rewarding other employees). The 
foregoing discussion leads us to propose that the pay level individuals receive relative to a 
deserved pay level is related to pay fairness in a non-symmetric curvilinear curve, which is 
consistent with the “too much of a good thing” effect (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). Hence, we 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2a: The deserved comparison between one’s actual pay level and one’s 
deserved pay level has a non-symmetric curvilinear relationship with pay fairness, such 
that pay fairness increases as one’s actual pay level increases toward one’s deserved pay 
level, continues to increase as one’s actual pay level exceeds one’s deserved pay level, 
and decreases when the excess is considerable. 
We further propose that pay fairness is the same when both actual pay level and deserved 
pay level are high and when both are low. As discussed previously, justice is achieved by giving 
people what they believe they deserve (Feinberg, 1974). That is, the pay that satisfies ones’ due 
is perceived to be fair regardless of the absolute level. Skitka and Mullen (2002) posit that people 
perceive high fairness if their pay is consistent with their internalized norms of their deserved 
pay, thus validating their self-respect and self-esteem. Therefore, individuals who receive a 
relatively low-level pay and believe that they deserve such an amount perceive the same level of 
pay fairness as those who receive a relatively high-level pay and believe that they deserve such 
an amount (Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas, & Weinblatt, 1999).  
Hypothesis 2b: Pay fairness is the same when one’s actual and deserved pay levels are 
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both high as when both are low. 
Moderating Effects of Preference for Consistency 
So far, we have discussed how social and deserved comparisons are associated with pay 
fairness judgments. We now discuss how individuals differ from one another in terms of the 
effects of social and deserved comparisons on their pay fairness judgments. Preference for 
consistency is one individual difference that can strengthen or mitigate the non-symmetric 
curvilinear effects of social comparison associated with pay fairness judgments. Preference for 
consistency refers to the sensitivity of individuals to consistency, regularity, and coherence 
(Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995; Nail et al., 2001). Although people generally prefer to be 
predictable, stable, and consistent, they have different levels of preference for consistency 
(Guadagno, Asher, Demaine, & Cialdini, 2001). Individuals with a high preference for 
consistency are highly vulnerable to inconsistency, dissonance, uncertainty, and different 
outcomes across people, whereas those with a low preference for consistency tend to favor 
spontaneity, change, unpredictability, and uncertainty (Cialdini et al., 1995; Guadagno et al., 
2001; Nail et al., 2001). As such, people with a higher preference for consistency tend to be more 
sensitive to whether their pay is consistent with that of similar others (i.e., a high equity 
sensitivity, attending to whether their outcome/input ratios equal to those of similar others, 
Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1987), and are more liable to experiencing the dissonance and 
psychological distress caused by inconsistency.  
As a result, they quickly notice being over-rewarded and experience the negative sense of 
dissonance and discomfort. It follows that they tend to quickly perceive their advantageous pay 
level compared with that of similar others as too excessive and unfair. By contrast, people with a 
lower preference for consistency are less susceptible to the dissonance feelings caused by 
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inconsistency and perceive advantageous payment to themselves as impartial. Thus, the 
“threshold” that they start to feel overpayment as unfair will occur later than those with higher 
preference for consistency. That is, individuals with high preference for consistency would be 
more sensitive to overpayment in relation to similar others (i.e., fairness-related information). As 
a result, the “threshold” that they start to feel overpayment as unfair will occur more quickly than 
those with low preference for consistency. Taken together, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 3: Preference for consistency moderates the curvilinear relationship between 
social comparison and pay fairness predicted by Hypothesis 1a, such that the bend in the 
curvilinear relationship occurs more quickly when preference for consistency is high 
rather than low. 
Moderating Effects of Preference for the Merit Principle 
Preference for the merit principle is an individual trait that can affect the sensitivity of 
people to deserved comparison associated with fairness judgments. The merit principle refers to 
“a pay fairness rule that prescribes that an individual’s relative outcomes (e.g., pay) should be 
allocated in proportion to his or her relative inputs (e.g., effort)” (Son Hing et al., 2011, p. 493). 
Individuals who highly value the merit principle believe that only contributions or inputs can 
influence outcome allocations (Aberson, 2007; Major et al., 2007). They are strongly opposed to 
potentially merit-violating practices (Son Hing et al., 2011). As a result, when they receive more 
favorable outcomes than what they believe they deserve, individuals who believe outcomes 
ought to be distributed on the basis of merit may perceive the over-favorable pay as undue and 
judge that it is an unfair treatment. In other words, individuals with a high preference for merit 
principle will be less influenced by an egocentric bias and more quickly to reach the “threshold.” 
By contrast, individuals with a low preference for the merit principle are less sensitive to merit-
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violating issues in the overpayment situations (Aberson, 2007; Major et al., 2007; Son Hing, 
Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002), thus being more likely to exhibit the egocentric bias and less likely to 
feel guilt or uneasiness when they receive a more favorable pay than what they deserve.  
Hypothesis 4: Preference for the merit principle moderates the curvilinear relationship 
between deserved comparison and pay fairness as predicted by Hypothesis 2a, such that 
the bend in the curvilinear relationship occurs more quickly when preference for the 
merit principle is high rather than low. 
Figure 1 depicts a theoretical model that proposes the moderating effects of preference 
for consistency and preference for the merit principle on the non-symmetric curvilinear social 
and deserved comparisons processes. To test the research model, we conducted two studies. 
Study 1 used a survey design to examine how social/deserved comparison—based on the 
respondents’ perceptions on their pay, similar others’ pay, and deserved pay—would be related 
to pay fairness, and how preference for consistency and preference for the merit principle would 
moderate these relationships. In Study 1, we applied polynomial regression and response surface 
methodology (Edwards & Parry, 1993) to directly test our research questions. Study 2 involved 
two scenario-based experiments in which participants were part-time MBA students at a 
university. Study 2 manipulated one’s own pay, a similar other’s pay, and deserved pay to 
demonstrate their causal effects on pay fairness. These two studies complement each other and 
provide compelling evidence for the non-symmetric curvilinear relationships between 
social/deserved comparison and pay fairness and the moderating effects of preference for 
consistency and preference for the merit principle.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Study 1: Survey Design 
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Method 
Participants and Procedures 
The data were collected from 167 employees working in various sectors of the United 
States, including finance, technology, food service, insurance, government, retail, medical, and 
manufacturing. To recruit participants, researchers sent an electronic message to 312 students in 
upper-level management courses and provided them with the opportunity to help with a study for 
extra credit. Students who worked at least 20 hours per week in a job were allowed to participate 
in the study; if they did not, they were asked to invite a friend or family member to complete the 
survey. To ensure the anonymity of the respondents, they were not asked to place their names 
anywhere on the questionnaire. All questionnaires began by asking the respondents to assess 
their preference for consistency and preference for the merit principle. The participants were then 
asked to assess how much pay they receive, how much pay a similar other (i.e., who performs a 
similar job with similar qualifications, such as education and skills) receives, and how much they 
deserve to receive. After assessing the pay, the participants were asked to evaluate the fairness of 
the pay that they receive and to report demographic information.  
A total of 167 respondents participated in the survey, thus yielding a 54% response rate. 
The respondents were 47.2% female and 51.2% Caucasian (17.1% Hispanic, 11.0% Asian 
American, and 10.4% African–American). Their average age was 25.1 years, and their average 
experience in the organization was 3.1 years.  
Measures 
Level of one’s pay. To determine the level of pay the employees receive, we used 
Edwards, Cable, Williamson, Lambert, and Shipp’s (2006) three-item scale in assessing pay as 
one of the important job dimensions. The respondents assessed the amount of pay that they 
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receive at work on the basis of three items (i.e., “Salary level,” “The amount of pay,” and “The 
opportunity to become financially wealthy”) on a seven-point Likert-type scale (where 1 = “A 
small amount” and 7 = “A very great amount”). 
Level of a similar other’s pay. To assess the level of pay that a similar other receives, we 
utilized the measure of Edwards et al. (2006) as described above, but this time we provided the 
following instruction: “How much do your peers have at work? By peers, we mean people who 
have similar job responsibilities with similar levels of education and experiences they bring to 
the job in your organization.” An assumption that must be met in the polynomial regression 
analysis is that the two predictor variables must be commensurate (Edwards, 2002). That is, the 
predictors must represent the same conceptual domain and be measured with the same items and 
graded on the same scales. Thus, a similar other’s pay should be assessed with the same items 
and graded on the same scale as one’s pay but with a different referent (i.e., similar others’ pay).  
Level of one’s deserved pay. To assess the level of deserved pay, we used the measure of 
Edwards et al. (2006) as described above with the same scale again. This time the respondents 
were asked to assess level of their deserved pay based on the following instruction: “How much 
should you have at work? By should, we mean your own belief about how much you deserve.” 
Pay fairness. We assessed perceived pay fairness following Kim et al. (2015). The 
respondents were asked to assess the extent to which they perceived their pay (i.e., “Salary 
level,” “The amount of pay,” and “The opportunity to become financially wealthy”) to be fair on 
a seven-point Likert-type scale (where 1 = “Not at all fair” and 7 = “Extremely fair”).  
Preference for consistency. We adopted the 18-item scale of Cialdini et al. (1995) to 
measure the preference for consistency. We omitted 12 items from this measure in order to 
reduce the length of the survey, and because they assess how much a focal person prefers to 
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behave consistently toward others, which may not relate to the focal person’s pay fairness 
perceptions based on social comparison. The six items that we used assess how much a focal 
person prefers to be treated consistently from others, which can directly relate to how the focal 
person reacts to social comparison on their own pay and that of a similar other. Sample items 
include “I prefer to be around people whose reactions I can anticipate,” and “I want my close 
friends to be predictable.” We assessed them on a seven-point Likert-type scale (where 1 = 
“Strongly disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree”).  
Preference for the merit principle. We assessed preference for the merit principle using 
the scale of Davey, Bobocel, Son Hing, and Zanna (1999). Among its 15 items, we deleted five 
that are worded negatively and thus could potentially be a source of method bias (Idaszak & 
Drasgow, 1987; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). In addition, presenting a long 
survey could demotivate the respondents and reduce the accuracy of their responses. Sample 
items include “The efforts that a worker puts into a job should be reflected in the size of the raise 
he/she receives,” “In life, people should get what they deserve,” and “The members of a work 
team should receive different amounts of pay depending on the amount that they contribute to 
the organization.” We assessed them on a seven-point Likert-type scale (where 1 = “Strongly 
disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree”). 
Control variables. Consistent with previous research on pay fairness (e.g, Kim et al., 
2015), we controlled for the respondents’ demographics of age, sex, and organizational tenure. 
We also controlled for similar others’ pay and its interactive terms with one’s pay when we 
tested the effects of deserved comparison on pay fairness because one’s sense of what one 
deserves could be tied to the social comparison with similar others. In a similar vein, we 
controlled for deserved pay and its interactive terms with one’s pay when we tested the effects of 
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social comparison on pay fairness. 
Analytical Strategies 
To test how congruence and incongruence between one’s pay and the pay what similar 
others receive (or what they believe they should receive) affect pay fairness, we employed 
polynomial regression (Edwards & Parry, 1993). It has been used in organizational justice (e.g., 
Ambrose & Schminke, 2007; Kim et al., 2015), and has been frequently applied to other 
management areas such as person-environment fit (e.g., Edwards & Shipp, 2009) and work and 
family conflict (e.g., Edwards & Rothbard, 1999). In addition, we tested the moderating effects 
of preference for the merit principle and consistency on the relationships between 
social/deserved comparison and pay fairness using hierarchical regression analysis (Cohen, 
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). The five terms for social/deserved comparison were multiplied by 
preference for the merit principle (or consistency), and the increment in R2 yielded by these 
terms was tested while controlling for preference for the merit principle (or consistency) and the 
other three items related to other comparison effects. If the increment in R2 was statistically 
significant, we showed the effects of social and deserved comparisons on pay fairness based on 
the levels of preference for consistency (or the merit principle). 
Results 
We tested whether the key variables (i.e., one’s pay, similar other’s pay, deserved pay, 
pay fairness, preference for consistency, and preference for the merit principle) are distinct by 
running confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs). We assessed the model fit using the chi-square 
statistic, the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), and the root-mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA). The result shows that the six-factor model did not fit 
the data well (i.e., χ2 (167, 120) = 573.88, p < .01, TLI = .70, CFI = .77, and RMSEA = .15), 
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mainly due to high correlations among one’s pay, similar other’s pay, deserved pay, and pay 
fairness perceptions. Nevertheless, these results are expected because, from a conceptual 
standpoint, the measures should be highly correlated. For example, most people think that the 
pay they receive is similar to that received by others because they bring similar inputs to their 
jobs. Also, due to egocentric bias (Chen et al., 2002; Greenberg, 1983; Lind et al., 1998), one’s 
pay level would be highly correlated to pay fairness perceptions. In addition, we 
methodologically utilized the same items to measure levels of one’s pay, a similar other’s pay, 
and one’s deserved pay owing to the requirements of polynomial regression analysis (i.e., 
measurement commensuration) as well as pay fairness. For scales with such identical item stems, 
researchers suggest using the correlated uniqueness (CU) model (Gaspard, Häfner, Parrisius, 
Trautwein, & Nagengast, 2017; Marsh, 1989; Marsh & Hau, 1996; Nagengast, Trautwein, 
Kelava, & Ludtke, 2013; Schütte, Zimmermann, & Köller, 2017). Empirical studies employing 
polynomial regression analysis also utilized the CU model to conduct the CFAs (e.g., Schütte et 
al., 2017). Following these suggestions, we ran the CU model that correlated the residual terms 
for those measures collected using different evaluation standards for pay (i.e., one’s pay, similar 
other’ pay, one’s deserved pay, and pay fairness). The CU model fits to the data well (i.e., χ2 
(167, 102) = 129.06, p < .01, TLI = .98, CFI = .99, and RMSEA = .04). These analyses suggest 
that the measures of the constructs are consistent with the nature of the constructs1. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive results, reliabilities, and correlations of the measures are shown in Table 
I. As expected, one’s actual pay was more strongly correlated with pay fairness than a similar 
other’s and one’s deserved pay (r = .61, .43, and .18, respectively).  
[Insert Table I about here] 
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Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1a proposes that pay fairness increases as one’s pay increases toward what a 
similar other receives, continues to increase as one’s pay exceeds what a similar other receives, 
and decreases when one’s pay exceeds a certain threshold. Table II shows a positive value for 
b1–b2 (.40, p < .05) and a significant negative value for b4–b5+b7 (–.44, p < .01), which represent 
a significant negative (i.e., downward) curvature along the I = –O line. These results suggest that 
employees perceive low pay fairness when they receive a lower pay than their peers, perceive 
high pay fairness when they receive better outcomes than their peers up to a point, then perceive 
low pay fairness when their overpayment reaches high levels. Thus, Hypothesis 1a is supported. 
[Insert Table II about here] 
Hypothesis 1b proposes that pay fairness increases as one’s and a similar other’s pay 
increases from low to high. Table II shows a positive and significant value for b1+b2 (.54, p 
< .01) and a non-significant value for b4+b5+b7 (–.08, n.s.). This finding indicates that pay 
fairness increases as the pay received by one and a similar other also increases from low to high. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1b is supported. 
Figure 2 illustrates that along the I = –O line, pay fairness had a non-symmetric 
curvilinear relationship with one’s and a similar other’s pay. Specifically, pay fairness increased 
as one’s pay increased toward that of a similar other, leveled off as one’s pay exceeded that of a 
similar other, and decreased when the overpayment was excessive. In addition, along the I = O 
line, pay fairness linearly increased as both one’s and a similar other’s pay increased 
simultaneously. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Hypothesis 2a proposes that pay fairness increases as one’s actual pay increases toward 
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one’s deserved pay, continues to increase as one’s actual pay exceeds one’s deserved pay, and 
decreases when the actual pay exceeds a certain threshold. Table II shows that the slope of the 
surface was positive along the I = –D line at point I = 0, D = 0 (b1–b3 = .81, p < .01). In addition, 
the downward curvature along this line was negative and significant (b4–b6+b8 = –.32, p < .05). 
This finding shows that people perceive high fairness when their pay exceeds what they deserve 
up to a point, but then perceive low fairness when their overpayment reaches high levels. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2a is supported.  
Hypothesis 2b states that pay fairness remains the same when one’s actual and deserved 
pay are both high and low. Table II shows non-significant values for b1+b3 and b4+b6+b8 (.13, 
n.s.; –.17, n.s., respectively). This finding indicates that pay fairness does not statistically differ 
when actual and deserved pay are both high and low. Therefore, Hypothesis 2b is supported. 
Figure 3 illustrates that pay fairness increased as one’s actual pay increased toward one’s 
deserved pay, continued to increase as one’s actual pay exceeded one’s deserved pay, and 
decreased when the overpayment was excessive. Also, along the I = D line, pay fairness did not 
significantly increase when the actual and deserved pay both increased from low to high2.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Hypothesis 3 states that preference for consistency would moderate the curvilinear 
relationship between social comparison and pay fairness predicted by Hypothesis 1a, such that 
the bend in the curvilinear relationship occurs more quickly when preference for consistency is 
high rather than low. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, a hierarchical regression analysis revealed a 
significant moderating effect of preference consistency on the relationship between social 
comparison and pay fairness (ΔR2 = .04, p < .05). Specifically, the location of the bend in the 
inverted U-shaped relationship between social comparison and pay fairness predicted by 
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Hypothesis 1a was further above the point of balance among the individuals with low (rather 
than high) preference for consistency. Figure 4, which depicts the surfaces for the effects of 
social comparison on pay fairness at two levels of preference for consistency, illustrates these 
results. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that preference for the merit principle would moderate the 
curvilinear relationship between deserved comparison and pay fairness predicted by Hypothesis 
2a, such that the bend in the curvilinear relationship occurs more quickly when preference for the 
merit principle is high rather than low. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, a hierarchical regression 
analysis revealed a significant moderating effect of preference for the merit principle on the 
relationship between deserved comparison and pay fairness (ΔR2 = .05, p < .01). Specifically, the 
location of the bend in the inverted U-shaped relationship between deserved comparison and pay 
fairness predicted by Hypothesis 1a was further above the point of balance among the individuals 
with low (rather than high) preference for the merit principle. Figure 5, which depicts the 
surfaces for the effects of deserved comparison on pay fairness at two levels of preference for the 
merit principle, illustrates these results. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported. 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
Study 2: Scenario-Based Experiments 
In Study 1, although we observed non-symmetric curvilinear relationships between 
social/deserved comparison and pay fairness and the moderating effects of preference for 
consistency and preference for the merit principle, some limitations exist. First, we cannot 
establish causality in the relationships among the variables because our data are cross-sectional. 
Second, our measurements of one’s pay, similar others’ pay, and deserved pay were perceptually 
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based, while not including objective measures, such as actual pay or a formative index based on 
different pay forms. Third, to what extent the respondents had good data on the pay of others in 
the organization was unclear.  
To address these issues, we replicated our findings in Study 1 using scenario-based 
experiments. Specifically, we manipulated the experimental scenarios with different levels of 
pay incongruence (i.e., underpayment, pay congruence, and overpayment) between one’s actual 
pay and a similar other’s pay (or deserved pay); we also assessed pay fairness perceptions across 
the scenarios, following previous studies (e.g., Melamed, Park, Zhong, & Liu, 2014; Peters et al., 
2004; van den Bos et al., 1997; van den Bos et al., 2006). We conducted two separate 
experiments to test our research hypotheses on social comparison processes (i.e., Hypotheses 1a 
and 3) and deserved comparison processes (i.e., Hypotheses 2a and 4), respectively. 
Method 
Participants and Procedures 
Ninety-three (49 women and 44 men; Mage = 32.75 years old, SD = 5.13; Mtenure = 9.91 
years, SD = 5.52) and 92 (51 women and 41 men; Mage = 31.59 years old, SD = 4.62; Mtenure = 
8.81 years, SD = 4.67) part-time MBA students at a university located in Eastern China 
participated in Experiment 1 and 2, respectively for extra credit. Participants were instructed in 
both experiments that the study was to explore the factors influencing pay fairness perceptions in 
different scenarios. Following Melamed et al. (2014), participants were asked to imagine being 
as an “archiator” – an occupation that most of participants were presumed to not know. This 
practice ensured that participants were not be influenced by referential salary standards in reality. 
Participants then were asked whether they knew “archiator,” and those who knew this occupation 
would be excluded from the final sample. All participants were retained in this study based on 
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this question.  
Experiment 1 had a 5 (pay incongruence between one’s and similar others’ pay) × 3 
(preference for consistency: low vs. moderate vs. high) mixed design with “pay incongruence 
scenario” as a within-subjects factor and “preference for consistency” as a between-subjects 
factor. To partial out the potential impact of absolute salary levels on one’s pay fairness, this 
experiment followed previous studies (e.g., Peters et al., 2004; van den Bos et al., 1997; van den 
Bos et al., 2006) to fix the participants’ salary and to vary the salaries of similar others (i.e., 
peers who have similar job responsibilities with similar levels of education and experiences they 
bring to the job in the same organization). In the five scenarios, participants’ actual monthly 
salary was set to RMB7,500, whereas the monthly salary levels of five similar other archiators 
were RMB 4,500, RMB 5,500, RMB 6,500, RMB 7,500, and RMB 8,500, respectively3.  
The scenario with similar other’s pay as RMB 7,500 (i.e., the pay congruence scenario) 
was the baseline situation, the scenario with similar other’s pay as RMB 8,500 as the 
underpayment situation, and the scenarios with similar other’s pay as RMB 6,500, RMB 5,500, 
and RMB 4,500 as the overpayment situations. We set one underpayment scenario to replicate 
the finding that pay fairness perceptions in underpayment situations are lower than in the pay 
congruence situation as established in the literature. We set three scenarios with different levels 
of overpayment to investigate whether pay fairness perceptions do not differ significantly 
between mild overpayment situations and the pay congruence situation due to ego-centric bias, 
but are significantly lower in the situations that overpayment is excessive. The scenarios were 
presented in the survey randomly to minimize the potential ordering effects (Bond, Leung, & 
Wan, 1982). One case of the scenarios on social comparison was: 
My basic monthly salary is RMB 7,500. The basic monthly salary of similar other A 
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(who has similar job responsibilities with similar levels of education and experiences 
he/she bring to the job in my organization) is RMB 8,500. 
Following each scenario, the participants responded to one question on pay incongruence 
manipulation check (i.e., “Compared to similar other’s basic salary, how would you evaluate 
your salary?”) on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = “Much lower” to 7 = “Much higher”). 
Then, they assessed pay fairness perceptions across the scenarios (average Cronbach’s  = .76 in 
the five scenarios, ranging from .73 to .85) and their preference for consistency (Cronbach’s  = 
.76) with the same measures used in Study 1.  
In Experiment 2, the procedure and the instruction were the same as in Experiment 1 with 
one exception: we replaced a similar other’s salary with the deserved pay level. While the 
perceived deserved pay level of a job refers to an internal standard, it is not formed in a vacuum 
but socially induced and is based on one’s experience and knowledge about the job (Törnblom & 
Kazemi, 2015). In our experiment, following Melamed et al. (2014), we instructed the 
participants to imagine that they are an “archiator”—an occupation that the participants retained 
in the study did not know. By doing so, the participants would not be influenced by referential 
salary standards in reality. However, because the participants had no experience and knowledge 
about the archiator job, they could not determine the deserved pay level of this job. To address 
this issue, following previous studies (Bond et al., 1982; Zhou & Martocchio, 2001), we 
specified the deserved pay level for the subjects. Experiment 2 had a 5 (pay incongruence 
between one’s and deserved pay) × 3 (preference for the merit principle: low vs. moderate vs. 
high) mixed design with “pay incongruence scenario” as a within-subjects factor and “preference 
for the merit principle” as a between-subjects factor. One case of the scenarios on deserved 
comparison was: 
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My basic monthly salary is RMB 7,500. Based on the quality and quantity of my work 
outputs and contributions, I believe that my deserved monthly salary should be RMB 
8,500. 
Following each scenario, the participants responded to one question on pay incongruence 
manipulation check (i.e., “Compared to the quality and quantity of your work outputs and 
contributions, how would you evaluate your salary?”) on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = 
“Much lower” to 7 = “Much higher”). Then, they assessed pay fairness perceptions across the 
scenarios (average Cronbach’s  = .92 in the five scenarios, ranging from .91 to .94) and their 
preference for the merit principle (Cronbach’s  = .71) with the same measures used in Study 1.  
Manipulation Check 
Scenarios significantly impacted our pay incongruence manipulation check 
(Experiment1: F (4, 368) = 419.17, p < .01; Experiment 2: F (4, 364) = 333.64, p < .01). That is, 
the higher a similar other’s pay (or deserved pay) is, the lower the participants rated their actual 
pay relative to the similar other’s pay (or deserved pay). 
Results 
To test our hypotheses on social comparison, we conducted a 5 (pay incongruence 
scenarios) × 3 (preference for consistency) repeated measures ANOVA. This analysis shows that 
social comparison had a significant impact on pay fairness (F (4, 360) = 54.07, p < .01, η2 = .38), 
and the interaction effect of social comparison and preference for consistency was significant (F 
(8, 360) = 2.89, p < .01, η2 = .06). The means of pay fairness in the five scenarios are presented 
in Table 3. As shown in Table 3, as expected, pay fairness in the underpayment scenario (i.e., the 
scenario with RMB 8,500) (M8500 = 3.26) was lower than that in the baseline scenario (i.e., the 
scenario with RMB 7,500) (M7500 = 4.72, mean difference = 1.46, p < .01). In addition, compared 
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to baseline scenario, pay fairness in all the three overpayment scenarios were significantly lower 
(M6500 = 4.14, mean difference = .58, p < .01; M5500 = 3.74, mean difference = .98, p < .01; M4500 
= 3.42, mean difference = 1.3, p < .01). These results show a non-symmetric curvilinear pattern 
of pay fairness across the underpayment, baseline, and overpayment scenarios given that pay 
fairness in all the three overpayment scenarios were higher than the underpayment scenario 
(Mean = 4.14, 3.74, and 3.42 vs. 3.26), consistent with Hypothesis 1a. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
In addition, to test our hypotheses on deserved comparison, we conducted a 5 (pay 
incongruence scenarios) × 3 (preference for the merit principle) repeated measures ANOVA. 
This analysis shows a significant main effect of deserved comparison on pay fairness (F (4, 356) 
= 45.85, p < .01, η2 = .34), and a significant interaction effect between deserved comparison and 
preference for the merit principle (F (8, 356) = 3.01, p < .05, η2 = .06). The means of pay 
fairness in the five scenarios are presented in Table 3. Pay fairness in the underpayment scenario 
(i.e., the scenario with RMB 8,500) (M8500 = 3.08) was lower than that in the baseline scenario 
(M7500 = 4.46, mean difference = 1.38, p < .01). Pay fairness in the three overpayment scenarios 
was indifferent from that in the baseline scenario (M6500 = 4.49, mean difference = .03, n.s.; M5500 
= 4.51, mean difference = .05, n.s.; M4500 = 4.40, mean difference = .06, n.s., respectively), but 
was higher than that in the underpayment scenario (mean difference = 1.41, 1.43, and 1.32, 
respectively, p < .01). These results show the ego-centric bias implied in Hypothesis 2a. 
Given that preference for consistency and the merit principle are continuous variables, 
and the data in this study involved between- and within-person levels, we conducted a multi-
level analysis using Mplus 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). First, we generated four dummy 
variables to represent the five pay incongruence scenarios with the scenario with RMB 7,500 as 
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the baseline scenario. Then, we mean-centered preference for consistency and the merit principle 
and generated four interaction terms based on the dummy variable and the mean-centered 
moderators. 
For the moderating effects of preference for consistency, the –2loglikelihood test shows 
that adding the four interaction terms significantly improved the model fit (–2loglikelihood = 
1186.95, d.f. = 16) compared to the model with the four dummy variables and preference for 
consistency (–2loglikelihood = 1202.64, d.f. = 8; Δχ2(8) = 15.68, p < .05), suggesting a 
significant moderating effect of preference for consistency. Also, the interaction terms for 
scenarios with RMB 4,500, RMB 5,500, RMB 6,500, and RMB 8,500 were significant (γ = –.24, 
p < .05; γ = –.23, p < .01; γ = –.12, p < .05; γ = –.24, p < .01, respectively). Specifically, as 
shown in Figure 6a, for the participants with high preference for consistency, pay fairness 
decreased more substantially when they receive more pay than similar others than did those with 
low preference for consistency, supporting Hypothesis 3.   
For the moderating effects of preference for the merit principle, the –2loglikelihood result 
show that adding the four interaction terms significantly improved the model fit (–2loglikelihood 
= 1300.85, d.f. = 16) compared to the compared to the model with the four dummy variables and 
preference for consistency (–2loglikelihood = 1327.80, d.f. = 8; Δχ2(8) = 26.95, p < .01), 
suggesting a significant moderating effect of preference for the merit principle. Also, the 
interaction term for the scenario with RMB 4,500 was significant (γ = –.50, p < .05), whereas 
other interaction terms were not significant (γ = –.21, n.s.; γ = –.05, n.s.; γ = –.08, n.s., for 
scenarios with RMB 5,500, RMB 6,500, and RMB 8,500, respectively). Specifically, as shown 
in Figure 6b, for the participants with high preference for the merit principle, pay fairness 
decreased when they received more pay than deserved, whereas for those with low preference for 
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the merit principle pay fairness still increased when they received more pay than deserved. These 
results suggest that individuals with a low preference for the merit principle are less likely to feel 
guilty or uneasy when they receive a more favorable pay than what they deserve, providing 
support for Hypothesis 4.   
 [Insert Figure 6a and 6b about here]  
Discussion 
Theoretical Implications 
Our findings provide several important theoretical implications for equity theory. First, 
we demonstrated that both social and deserved comparisons significantly affected pay fairness in 
general. The current justice theories devote little attention to examining the comparison 
processes in justice judgments. According to Mussweiler (2003, p. 472), “human judgment is 
comparative in nature.” That is, individuals evaluate a target or experience by comparing the 
evaluated target or experience with comparison referents, such as internal (e.g., desires, values, 
or beliefs) and external standards (e.g., similar others). Theories of justice were originally rooted 
in comparison processes (e.g., Adams, 1965), but the emphasis of the field shifted to perceptions 
of “fairness” without explicitly examining the comparison processes underlying such 
perceptions. This article brought comparison processes back into the picture, addressed the 
cognitive aspects of such comparisons, and examined how they influence pay fairness. 
On the one hand, our findings are important to developing and refining research literature 
that reveals the important role of deserved comparison in pay fairness perceptions (Folger & 
Cropanzano, 2001; Leung & Tong, 2003; Luna-Arocas & Tang, 2015; Skitka & Mullen, 2002). 
To our best knowledge, this study is the first to examine how deserved comparison affects pay 
fairness using the cognitive appraisal approach. More importantly, by using the same approach to 
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examine the different comparison standards associated with pay fairness (i.e., social and 
deserved standards), this study sheds light on the potential for this approach to be applied to 
other comparison standards, thus increasing our understanding of the psychological processes by 
which people form pay fairness perceptions. For example, in a field study, we found a non-
symmetric curvilinear relationship between social comparison and pay fairness for pay 
incongruence consistent with Kim et al. (2015), and a similar result with deserved comparison. 
However, we theorized different reasons for why people feel unfairness with overpayment for 
social comparison (i.e., cognitive dissonance) and deserved comparison (i.e., feeling uneasy or 
guilty to use organizational resources excessively). Future research needs to test the different 
underlying reasons for social and deserved comparisons associated with pay incongruence. 
It is also noteworthy that in the experiment for deserved comparison, the pay fairness 
even in the largest overpayment scenario was not significantly lower than that in the baseline 
scenario, despite a declining tendency. A plausible explanation is that the psychological 
discomfort due to a sense of guilt created by overpayment for deserved comparison in the 
experiment is not strong. We suggest that future research should design the levels of 
overpayment scenarios more carefully and creates contexts (e.g., types of jobs and organization) 
that can affect individual reactions to overpayment more clearly to cross-validate our survey 
findings. Also, a closer examination for the exact threshold that people start to perceive 
overpayment as less fair provides an avenue for future research. 
In addition, for pay congruence conditions, we found that social and deserved comparison 
affect pay fairness differently. Unlike social companion in which pay fairness increased as one’s 
actual and similar others’ pay levels both increased, in deserved comparison pay fairness 
remained the same as one’s actual and the deserved pay levels both increased. This finding 
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confirms our proposition that social comparison is largely motivated by self-interests whereas 
deserved comparison is mainly driven by deontic motives and morality needs. Future research 
should explicitly test these different underlying mechanisms. 
On the other hand, our study offers new insight into the social comparison process 
underlying the formation of pay fairness. Recent empirical studies seek to extend the social 
comparison by adopting a social network perspective and directly testing the influence of 
referent networks on pay fairness (e.g., Melamed et al., 2014). Consistent with Melamed et al. 
(2014), we found that pay fairness was lower when one’s reward level was different from (i.e., 
higher or lower) that of similar others in the referent networks. Extending their finding, however, 
we found a non-symmetric curvilinear relationship between social comparison and pay fairness 
in the field study, that is, pay fairness increased even after one’s pay exceeded that of a similar 
other until a certain point in the survey design. Our findings, therefore, delineate a more fine-
grained picture of how perceived pay fairness varies with social and deserved comparisons. 
Moreover, our findings suggest that Kim et al.’s (2015) results showing that Chinese, Japanese, 
and Korean employees perceive higher fairness when they and similar others both receive higher 
pay instead of lower pay can be generalized to American employees whose cultural norms for 
equal resource allocations across people were likely quite different from Kim et al.’s (2015) 
investigation of East Asians.   
Next, we identified the boundary conditions for the effects of social and deserved 
comparisons on pay fairness by examining the moderating effects of preference for consistency 
and preference for the merit principle. We demonstrated that individuals with high preference for 
consistency and those with high preference for the merit principle perceived the more favorable 
pay than what similar others received or the pay that they deserved as being more unfair. These 
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results extend the current studies on social (e.g., Chen et al., 2002) and deserved comparisons 
(e.g., Folger & Cropanzano, 2001; Skitka & Mullen, 2002) associated with fairness judgments by 
revealing the individual differences in the comparison processes. 
Practical Implications 
Our study provides several practical implications for organizations, HR managers, and 
supervisors. First, organizations and HR managers who wish to treat their employees fairly can 
be more successful if they pay more attention to their employees’ internal standards about how 
they should be treated in addition to how they are treated compared to similar others who are 
similar in terms of education, job responsibility, and experiences. Thus, when designing and 
executing compensation system, organizations and HR managers need to not only consider the 
alignment across different employees working on similar jobs (Newman, Gerhart, & Milkovich, 
2017), but also the deserved standards held by employees.  
Second, our findings on non-symmetric curvilinear relationships suggest that 
overpayment may contribute to employee’s pay fairness perceptions to some extent but 
eventually destroys them. As such, overpayment compared to similar others and deservingness 
would reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of compensation system by not only increasing 
pay budget for organizations, but also harming pay fairness and in turn demotivating employees. 
Thus, organizations need to conduct pay survey carefully and dynamically to better understand 
the pay levels that can enhance pay fairness perceptions. The pay survey should not only ask pay 
fairness perceptions but also the perceptions of one’s pay level as well as the levels of similar 
others and deserved pay. Organizations can use such information to understand when pay 
fairness perceptions decrease (under- or over-payment based on social/deserved comparison) and 
adjust the payments accordingly. 
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In addition, supervisors should take care of individual differences in deciding pay rates 
and communicating the decisions with employees effectively. In particular, for those with high 
preference for consistency and high preference for the merit principle, supervisors need to note 
that they are more likely to be sensitive to overpayment as well as underpayment. Thus, 
supervisors should put more efforts to understand their subordinates’ values and life principles 
that can affect their pay fairness perceptions and to explain their decisions on pay levels 
effectively to employees (He et al., 2016), especially to those who are very sensitive to 
underpayment.  
Limitations and Strengths 
It should be noted that this study has some limitations. First, other comparison standards, 
such as needs or expectations, were not examined in this study and should be examined in future 
work. For example, in India, where people highly care about what others need, individuals who 
receive a pay that is lower than what they need perceive such a compensation as unfair (Morris 
& Leung, 2000). In addition, this study used peers to represent the similar others. Future studies 
can build a comprehensive model that examines how different types of social referents can affect 
justice judgments (cf. Kulik & Ambrose, 1992).  
Second, the data in Study 1 were cross-sectional and self-reported, thus raising the 
concerns about the common method variance problem. However, if the common method 
variance bias is severe, all the simple correlations among the measures should be significant 
(Spector, 2006). In this study, the correlations between preference for the merit principle and 
consistency and pay fairness were not significant. Also, common method variance has a marginal 
impact on nonlinear relationships (Crampton & Wagner, 1994), and all the research hypotheses 
in our study are based on curvilinear effects, suggesting that common method variance unlikely 
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influences the results. Furthermore, we conducted Study 2 with an experimental design and 
replicated most findings of Study 1, which could largely alleviate this concern. 
Another limitation of this study is that we did not include any of the reverse-scored items 
for the preference for merit principle scale. This was done to improve the reliability of the 
measure and to shorten the survey, thus increasing the accuracy of their responses. Nevertheless, 
excluding these items may introduce other types of error in the measure (e.g., some participants 
may simply click the same response option on the entire scale without reading the items). We 
suggest that future research should validate our findings with all the items for the preference for 
merit principle scale. 
The limitations of our study can be alleviated by three strengths. First, most previous 
studies have measured social comparison by using one measure (i.e., by asking the respondents 
to assess directly their relative compensation compared with that of a similar other (e.g., Chen et 
al., 2002; Leung et al., 1996). By contrast, in our study we separately assessed one’s and a 
similar other’s pay level, and thus we can test how one’s pay level and that of similar others 
jointly affect pay fairness. Second, we explored theoretically derived individual differences to 
check for the boundary conditions on how much overpayment was deemed acceptable. Third, we 
adopted both a field study and an experimental study to examine our research hypotheses. Our 
survey approach used in the field study allowed for continuous measurement of relative under- 
and over-payment, which enabled us to model upon the continuous “degree” of equity and 
inequity. On the other hand, the experiments manipulated specific levels of under- and over-
payment scenarios (Adams, 1965). Taken together, we offered a comprehensive examination of 
the influence of social and deserved comparisons on pay fairness perceptions. 
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FIGURE 1. The Non-Symmetric Relationship between Social/Deserved Comparison and Pay 
Fairness 
Individual Differences in Pay Fairness 48 
  
Note: On the X, Y Plane, the line running diagonally from the near corner to the far corner 
represents the I = O line, and the line running diagonally left to right represents the I = O line. 
FIGURE 2. Estimated Surfaces Relating Pay Fairness to Pay the Self and Similar Others 
Receive 
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Note: On the X, Y Plane, the line running diagonally from the near corner to the far corner 
represents the I = D line, and the line running diagonally left to right represents the I = D line. 
FIGURE 3. Estimated Surfaces Relating Fairness in Pay to Pay One Receives and Deserves 
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FIGURE 4. Estimated Surfaces Relating Pay Fairness to Pay the Self and Similar Others 
Receive: (a) High Preference for Consistency (b) Low Preference for Consistency 
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FIGURE 5. Estimated Surfaces Relating Fairness in Pay to Pay One Receives and Deserves: (a) 
High Preference for Merit (b) Low Preference for Merit 
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FIGURE 6. The Relationship between Pay Incongruence and Pay Fairness in Experiments 
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TABLE I. Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and Coefficients for Variables in All Data. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Age 26.45 8.94 ─         
2. Sex (0 = male, 1 = female) 0.44 0.50 –.04 ─        
3. Organizational tenure 2.95 2.92 .50 –.09 ─       
4. One’s actual pay 3.93 1.25 .15 –.00 .17 (.72)      
5. A similar other’s pay 4.12 1.33 .16 –.05 .10 .73 (.79)     
6. One’s deserved pay 5.17 1.18 .20 –.04 .17 .57 .51 (.73)    
7. Preference for the merit principle 5.36 0.82 .06 –.12 .01 –.12 –.13 .06 (.89)   
8. Preference for consistency 4.50 1.07 .22 .12 .00 .15 .11 .22 .14 (.84)  
9. Fairness in pay 4.44 1.26 .08 .00 .13 .61 .43 .18 .03 .00 (.79) 
 
Note: N = 167. Reliabilities are in parentheses. For all correlation above |.15|, p < .05; and above |.20|, p < .01. 
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TABLE II. Results from the Quadratic Regressions of Pay Fairness on Social and Deserved Comparisons 
Dependent Variables Results controlling for age, sex, tenure, D, ID, and D2 Shape along I = O line Shape along I = –O line 
 I O I2 IO O2 R2  b1 + b2 b4 + b5 + b7  b1 – b2 b4 – b5 + b7 
Fairness in pay .47** .07 –.28** .18* .02 .50** .54** –.08 .40* –.44** 
 Results controlling for age, sex, tenure, O, IO, and O2 Shape along I = D line Shape along I = –D line 
 I D I2 ID D2 R2  b1 + b3 b4 + b6 + b8  b1 – b3 b4 – b6 + b8 
Fairness in pay .47** –.34* –.28** .12 .08 .50** .13 –.17 .81** –.32* 
 
Note. N = 167. Unstandardized regression coefficients were used. I, O, and D are one’s actual pay, the pay a similar other receives, 
and deserved pay, respectively. Columns labeled b1 + b2 and b4 + b5 + b7 represent the slope of each surface along the I = O line, and 
columns labeled b1 – b2 and b4 – b5 + b7 represent the slope of each surface along the I = –O line (b1, b2, b4, b5, and b7 are the 
coefficients on I, O, I2, IO, O2, respectively). Columns labeled b1 + b3 and b4 + b6 + b8 represent the slope of each surface along the I = 
D line, and columns labeled b1 – b3 and b4 – b6 + b8 represent the slope of each surface along the I = –D line (b1, b3, b4, b6, and b8 are 
the coefficients on I, D, I2, ID, D2, respectively). 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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TABLE III. Pay Fairness in the Five Scenarios on Social and Deserved Comparisons 
 7,500 vs. 7,500 
(baseline) 
7,500 vs. 8,500 7,500 vs. 6,500 7,500 vs. 5,500 7,500 vs. 4,500 
Social Comparison      
Main effect of scenario 
(N = 93) 
 
4.72 (1.00) 3.26a (1.00) 4.14a (.88) 3.74a (.85) 3.42a (1.05) 
High preference for 
consistency (N = 31) 
4.60 (1.12) 2.88a (.73) 3.94a (.88) 3.42a (.74) 3.04a (1.00) 
Moderate preference for 
consistency (N = 31) 
4.97 (.99) 3.10a (.97) 4.14a (.79) 3.66a (.75) 3.32a (.87) 
Low preference for 
consistency (N = 31) 
4.58 (.86) 3.80a (1.05) 4.36 (.92) 4.13a (.90) 3.88a (1.13) 
Deserved Comparison      
Main effect of scenario 
(N = 92) 
 
4.46 (1.07) 3.08a (1.06) 4.49 (.99) 4.51 (1.21) 4.40 (1.36) 
High preference for the merit 
principle (N = 31) 
4.51 (1.06) 3.16a (.97) 4.28 (.96) 4.21 (1.20) 3.78a (1.27) 
Moderate preference for the 
merit principle (N = 31) 
4.40 (1.06) 2.74a (.96) 4.52 (.92) 4.68 (1.12) 4.63 (1.38) 
Low preference for the merit 
principle (N = 30) 
4.46 (1.13) 3.34a (1.18) 4.68 (1.08) 4.63 (1.30) 4.77 (1.25) 
 
Note. Mean pay fairness are shown, with standard deviation in parentheless. 
a Means differ significantly from the respective baseline scenario (p < .05). 
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Endnotes 
1 The CU model analyses may not eliminate the problem that the ability to examine the misfit 
effects is hampered. For example, owing to the high correlations between one’s pay and a similar 
other’s pay, a few cases, where one’s pay differs from a similar other’s pay, would exist. Such a 
phenomenon reduces the likelihood of the hypotheses on divergence to be supported. Thus, if 
these hypotheses are supported, they have essentially survived a conservative test (Kim, 2004). 
2 As supplementary analyses, we tested the effects of social and deserved comparisons on pay 
fairness perceptions without controlling for age, sex, and organizational tenure. The results are 
almost identical to the ones with controlling for them (i.e., b1+b2 = .50, p < .01, b4–b5+b7 = –.44, 
p < .01, b1+b3 = .16, n.s., b4–b6+b8 = –.35, p < .05). 
3 We designed the salary level based on the University’s annual statistics of student salary. The 
average monthly pre-degree salary of part-time MBA students was RMB7,508 with a standard 
deviation of 903 and a minimum of RMB4,438. Accordingly, we used RMB7,500 as the actual 
pay and RMB1,000 as the difference, and RMB4,500 as the lowest level. 
